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During the past decades developing  countries have become increasingly  integrated in 
global  trade  and  investment.  As  a  result,  agri-food  systems  in  these  countries  have 
undergone  substantial  changes  and  have  evolved  into  modern  global  supply  chains 
(Swinnen, 2007). Private and public standards have started playing an important role in 
these supply chains. Requirements on food quality and safety have become stringent and 
have affected the structure and organization of these supply chains.  GlobalGAP is the 
single most important standard in international food supply chains, and there is a general 
consensus that it has thoroughly affected the governance of modern supply  chains in 
fresh food products.  
  However, there is still debate on how the proliferation and increased stringency of 
food standards affect welfare. There are contradicting findings on the costs and benefits 
of certification at firm level (Graffham et al., 2007; Henson et al., 2011) and there is an 
ongoing debate on the welfare implications for the rural population that participates in 
these modern supply chains as contract farmers or employees. Studies have looked at 
how GlobalGAP leads to increased vertical integration and to its effects on smallholder 
exclusion  (Doland  and  Humphrey,  2000)  and  on  the  income  of  contract  farmers  and 
employees (Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; Maertens et al., 2011). Asfaw et al. (2009) find 
positive  health  implications  of  GlobalGAP  certification  for  smallholder  farmers.  Yet, 
there are no existing studies that analyze how GlobalGAP certification itself may affect 
the welfare of employees.  
  A  number  of  studies  have  focused  on  gender  discrimination  and  employment 
insecurity in high-value supply chains and on the impact of codes-of-conduct on gender 
discrimination and workers’ wellbeing (Barrientos and Smith, 2007; Nelson et al., 2007). 
Barrientos et al. (2005) and Oxfam (2004) put forward the concern that the increasing 
dominance of supermarkets in global supply chains lead to increased vulnerability of 
(mainly  female)  workers.  They    argue  that  much  of  the  employment  generated  by 
commercial horticulture for supermarkets is insecure and informal. Dolan (2004) argues 
that women are specifically preferred for this type of work because of the low cost and 
because it allows more flexible labour adjustment. 
  On the other hand, one may argue that modern supply chains and high standards 
are  associated  with  more  stable  relations,  which  could  potentially  trickle  down  to 
employees in developing countries. Barrientos and Kritzinger (2004) also mention for 
South African fruit exports that modern high-value supply chains may be associated with 
a more stable outlet and that on average prices are higher. While supermarkets mostly do 
not agree on the  upfront, they usually do negotiate on the quantity and quality six months 
in advance. They find that those firms that obtained EurepGAP certification or were in 
the process of compliance tended to engage less in the reduction of permanent labour. 
But on the other hand they argue that those firms that are left out of these supermarket-
led  value  chains  may  become  subject  to  even  more  volatile  markets,  which  may  be 
associated to increased uncertainty for workers (Barrientos and Kritzinger, 2004).  
   These studies only sum a number of potential arguments, and none has analyzed 
what the real effect is of the modernization of supply chains and the increased importance 3 
 
of private standards on employment insecurity. In this paper we combine secondary data 
on  firm-level  export  volumes,  with  company-level  interviews  and  unique  household 
survey data for the horticulture sector in Senegal. Based on interviews with Senegalese 
exporting firms, we illustrate that more stable exports and a longer exporting season are 
one of the main perceived advantages of GlobalGAP certification. We analyze the effect 
of GlobalGAP certification on the length of the export season of green bean exporting 
firms and find that GlobalGAP firms have a longer export season than non-GlobalGAP 
firms. While this might have been the case before certification already, it seems that the 
difference in the length of export season has increased after firms have become certified. 
Most interestingly, we analyze household survey data collected in the main exporting 
region of Senegal, Les Niayes. We find that employees employed at GlobalGAP certified 
firms  have  a  significantly  longer  season  of  employment  at  the  firm  and  that  their 
contracts are more on a seasonal and less on a day-to-day basis, compared to employees 
at non-GlobalGAP certified firms. This indicates that private standards certification may 




The impact of GlobalGAP certification 
Over the past decade public and private standards have increasingly gained importance in 
global food supply chains. Especially GlobalGAP (the former EurepGAP) has become 
very  widespread.  More  and  more  European  retailers  require  that  their  suppliers  are 
GlobalGAP certified and as a response the number of suppliers certified to GlobalGAP 
has been increasing largely over the past decade.  
Several concerns have  been raised concerning  the implication of this wave of 
GlobalGAP  certifications  on  producers  in  developing  countries,  often  focusing  at  the 
effects  on  smallholder  producers.  Graffham  et  al.  (2007)  show  that  compliance  to 
GlobalGAP is associated with significant costs. Asfaw et al. (2008) and Mausch et al. 
(2006)  argue  that  certification  and  the  associated  investments  for  compliance  are 
characterized  by  economies  of  scale,  which  disadvantages  smallholders.  Dolan  and 
Humphrey (2000) state that GlobalGAP leads to the exclusion of smallholders, while 
Asfaw et al. (2007) and Mausch et al. (2006) show that there are important income gains 
for those that succeed in getting certified.  Okello et al. (2007) indicate that certification 
is associated with greater productivity, increased market access, and reduced pesticide 
application. Maertens and Swinnen (2009) describe how the increasing importance of 
GlobalGAP leads to increasing levels of vertical integration by Senegalese green beans 
exporters and a reduction in the share of green beans source from contract farmers. All of 
these  studies  focus  on  producers  and  the  major  focus  in  this  literature  is  on  the 
implications for smallholders.  
The decision on GlobalGAP certification is most often taken by export firms, who 
are directly confronted with the demands by importers and see advantages in achieving 
compliance.  When  contract  farmers  get  GlobalGAP  certification,  this  is  mostly  in 
cooperation with (and often with financial support of) an exporting firm. Hence, it is 
crucial  to  understand  how  exporting  companies  decide  whether  or  not  to  engage  in 
certification  and  to  get  insights  in  the  constraints  and  opportunities  of  GlobalGAP 
certification. Henson et al. (2011) are the only ones that look specifically at the impact 4 
 
for firms rather than for smallholders. Henson, Masakure and Cranfield study to which 
extent export performance of firms is enhanced through GlobalGAP certification. They 
focus  on  the  fresh  produce  exports  from  10  Sub-Saharan  African  countries.  Using 
propensity score matching they show that GlobalGAP certification leads to higher export 
revenues.  
A number of studies have studied private standards other than GlobalGAP, and 
show that certification reduces costs, enhances a better and more consistent quality of the 
produce and improves the efficiency of the production process.  Certification also creates 
benefits through market-level effects: it lowers transaction costs, creates price premiums 
and better market access, growth in market share, and the ability to attract new customers 
(a.o.  Herath  et  al.  (2007)  for  Canadian  food  processing  ;  Corbett  et  al.  (20)05)  for 
ISO9000 certification in the US;  Maldonado et al. (2005) for HACCP in the Mexican 
meat industry). In this paper we look specifically into one of these market-level effects 
and especially at its trickle-down effects on employees.  
While  mostly  the  decision  on  certification  is  taken  by  these  export  firms,  it 
obviously  has  implications  for  downstream  actors.  This  often  concerns  smallholder 
farmers,  but  also  workers  employed  by  these  exporting  companies  may  be  affected. 
While  most  of  the  literature  on  standards  and  supply  chains  has  focused  on  the 
implications  for  smallholder  farmers,  Maertens  and  Swinnen  (2009),  Barrientos  and 
Kritzinger (2004) and Maertens et al. (2010) emphasize that a large share of the rural 
population  may  be  involved  through  employment  linkages,  rather  than  as  contract 
farmers.  They  show  that  large  income  effects  are  generated  by  employment  in  these 
sector, and that this employment is taken up by the poor and low-skilled. Yet there are no 
studies  analyzing  the  potential  implications  of  the  increasing  importance  of  private 
standards on employees in global food supply chains. 
Some  studies  have  analyzed  the  implications  of  labor  standards  and  standards 
setting  minimum  levels  of  employment  security  and  workers’  welfare.  Yet,  in  the 
Senegalese  horticulture  export  sector  (as  in  most  agricultural  export  sectors  in  Sub 
Saharan  Africa)  these  labor  standards  are  of  minor  importance.  Yet,  indirectly  also 
GlobalGAP may have implications on employees. To our knowledge, no studies have 
looked into the potential implications of GlobalGAP on employees before.  
In this paper we try to identify one potential channel through which GlobalGAP 
certification may affect the welfare of workers employed in the supply chain, namely 
through its effect on the length of the export season, the period of seasonal employment 
and employment insecurity. 
 
Horticulture exports and standards in Senegal 
 
We use data on the high-value horticulture export in Senegal. Our case study looks at 
companies and their employees active in green bean exports from Senegal to the EU. The 
value  of  fresh  fruits  and  vegetables  (FFV)  exports  from  Senegal  as  a  whole  have 
increased tremendously over the past decade: from 5 million US$ to 30 million US$ in 
2009 (Figure 1). While FFV exports have become more diversified in recent years, green 
beans are still the most important FFV export product. The bean supply chains involves 
several exporting companies and production is characterized by two systems: smallholder 
contract-farming and vertically integrated agro-industrial production. The production of 5 
 
green beans is concentrated in the region of Les Niayes. 90% of exported beans originate 
from this region.  
 
 
  Figure 1. Horticulture exports from Senegal, 1997 – 2006. 
 
Source: Eurotrans – Senegal 
 
  The  GlobalGAP  (the  former  EurepGAP)  standard  is  clearly  the  single  most 
important standard in Senegal. At the time of our first company level interviews in 2005, 
one company was certified, while three others were in the processes of certification. As a 
part  of  this  strategy  several  companies  started  their  own  production  and  reduced  the 
volume of produce source from smallholders significantly or even completely. By 2010, 
five companies obtained GlobalGAP certification. All of the 13 companies that we have 
interviewed stated that GlobalGAP certification was an extremely important strategy for 
the future. As a comparison, Organic standards were only considered important for 4 out 
of 13 companies, and FairTrade, BRC (the British Retail Consortium) and ETI (Ethical 
Trade Initiative) were only considered to be important by 1 or 2 companies, and were 
attributed much a much lower importance than GlobalGAP.  
  Earlier studies in the region indicate that employment in the horticulture export 
sector is an important source of income for the rural population of Les Niayes. In 2005 
and 2007, more than 30% of the households living in this area had at least one household 
member  that  was  employed  in  this  sector.  Maertens  and  Swinnen  (2009)  show  that 
employment  in  the  sector  have  a  very  large  positive  effect  on  incomes  and  that 
employment is mainly directed towards the poor and low-skilled households. Given that 
such a large number of rural poor are participating in the supply chain of green beans for 
export, it is interesting and important to understand how certification to GlobalGAP - 
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Our  analysis  is  based  on  company  level  interviews,  on  household  level  survey  data 
collected in the region Les Niayes in 2010, and on secondary data on export volumes of 
fresh fruits and vegetables by Senegalese companies.  
In total, 13 green bean exporting firms have been interviewed in January-February 
2009  and  in  April  2010.  The  semi-structured  questionnaire  included,  amongst  others, 
questions  on  the  export  volumes,  the  importance  of  public  and  private  standards, 
perceived  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  certification,  type  of  customers,  type  of 
contracts, production strategy, number of smallholders involved, etc.  
A household survey, including 300 randomly selected households in 25 villages 
situated in the region of Dakar and Thiès, was organized in July and August 2010. Out of 
these 300 households, 101 households had at least one member that was employed in the 
agro-export  of  beans  during  the  past  12  months.  Detailed  information  was  collected, 
including a.o. household demographic characteristics, land and non-land asset holdings, 
agricultural  production,  off-farm  employment  (including  employment  in  agro-export 
firms), self-employment and non-labor income. 
We use secondary data provided by the Senegalese DPV to test how GlobalGAP 
certification affects the length of the export season of green beans for 39 Senegalese 
exporting firms. For every firm we have information on how many kilograms of green 
beans  have  been  exporting  during  the  period  2001-2008.  For  a  number  of  years 
information is not complete. Export volumes are missing for some months or there is no 
monthly disaggregation at all. Therefore we use monthly disaggregated data only for the 
years 2003, 2005 and 2008,  which have complete information. Given that the first firm 
was certified in 2005 and 5 others became certified by 2008, these years capture both the 




The  season  of  green  bean  exports  from  Senegal  is  very  clearly  delimited  seasonally, 
which is mainly due to competition with other green bean producing countries (Morocco, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya). January, February and March are the typical export months for 
Senegalese green beans. This is clear from Figure 2, which illustrates the volumes of 
green beans exported in the seasons 2002-2003, 2004-2005 and 2007-2008. Volumes in 
November, December, April and May or more limited. The majority of firms only export 
in the peak months and do not have any exporting activity in the non-peak months.  In 
2005 and 2008, respectively 69 and 65 percent of the exporting companies were only 
active during a period of 4 months.  
Based on company level interviews, we found a first indication of the implication 
GlobalGAP might have on the stability and security of horticulture export activities and 
of employment in the horticulture export sector. Companies were asked to indicate what 
they perceive to be the major benefits of  GlobalGAP certification. The question was 
asked to both certified and non-certified companies.  11 out of 13 companies indicated 
that a more stable and longer export season was one of the main benefits of certification. 
12 out of 13 companies stated that GlobalGAP certification would not create any price 
premium. One of these 12 said that it probably had created a price premium for the first 7 
 
companies that achieved certification, referring to a first-mover advantage, but that this is 
not the case anymore today. 
 
Figure 2. Monthly volume of green beans exported from Senegal for the seasons 2002-
2003, 2004-2005, and 2007-2008. 
 
Source: DPV (Direction de la Protection des Végétaux), Dakar, Senegal 
 
 
Using monthly export statistics of Senegalese green bean exporting firms, collected by 
the  customs  at  the  port  and  airport  in  Dakar,  we  analyze  whether  companies  which 
obtained a GlobalGAP certificate have a longer export season than other companies. Not 
all  Senegalese  exporters  export  every  year.  They  may  decide  to  export  in  a  specific 
season  depending  on  their  financial  means  or  based  on  the  demand  by  customers. 
Looking  at  the  number  of  years  Senegalese  companies  have  actually  participated  in 
exporting reveals that there is a significant difference between GlobalGAP certified and 
non-GlobalGAP  certified  companies.  GlobalGAP  certified  companies  exporting  in  a 
larger number of years. Also the length of the export season is indeed found to differ 
according to GlobalGAP certification status. Companies that are certified have a longer 
export season and also the share of total yearly exports in the non-peak months is higher 
for  these  firms.  Obviously,  this  does  not  allow  us  to  conclude  that  GlobalGAP 
certification causes  a longer export season. Firms with large companies, larger volumes 
etc. are more likely to have a longer export season, and at the same time the pressure for 
certification may be higher for these firms, as well as the potential benefits.  
 
Table 1. GlobalGAP and the length of the export season by GlobalGAP and non-
GlobalGAP certified companies (2001-2008) 
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Total number of years exported a  2.4  4.6  0.00*** 
Nr of firms in sample  
(yearly data) 
43  5   
       
Nr of months exported       
in 2003  1.5  3.0  0.07* 
in 2005  1.4  5.2  0.00*** 
in 2008  1.0  3.4  0.00*** 
% volume exported in non-peak 
months b  
     
in 2003  3.8%  14.9%  0.01** 
in 2005  10.5%  16.2%  0.38 
in 2008  1.1%  8.8%  0.01** 
       
Nr of firms in sample  
(monthly data) 
34  5   
 
a Total number of years exported in the period 2001-2008. Data are missing for the seasons 2005-2006 and 2006-2007, 
hence the highest possible number of years that a company participated in exporting is 6.  
b We consider January, February and March to be the peak months for green bean exports, Non-peak months are 
November, December, April and May. 
 
Although  the  monthly  export  statistics  do  not  indicate  any  causality,  it  seems 
likely that GlobalGAP certification ensures access to customers that have a more stable 
demand. Think of supermarkets compared to spot market fruits and vegetable markets in 
Europe. GlobalGAP is a first requirement if one wants to supply European supermarkets, 
so ensuring compliance with this standards opens possibilities for selling larger and more 
stable  volumes,  over  a  longer  period.  Analysis  of  more  detailed  time-series  data  on 
exports and the exact moment of certification would allow to analyze this is more detail. 
We are currently working on an extension on this side. 
  What we are finally interested in, is the potential impact private standards may 
have  on  the  rural  poor  that  are  participating  in  modern  supply  chains.  Therefore  we 
analyze household survey data for employees that are working in the production, picking, 
sorting  and  handling  of  green  beans  for  export.  We  look  at the  number  of  days  and 
months that these workers have been employed in the agro-industry during a period of 12 
months. In addition, we study on which basis they are employed and compare between 
employment at companies with and without a GlobalGAP certificate. 
Table 2 illustrates the average number of months and days of employment in the 
agro-export  industry  during  a  period  of  one  year,  the  mean  salary,  and  the  status  of 
employment for workers employed in the export supply chain of green bean in the region 
of Les Niayes.  
 
Table 2: Period of employment during the past 12 months and employment status 
for employees in the export supply chain of green beans 
 
Mean  Employment in export supply chain of 
green beans 9 
 
Number of months employed  3.9   
Number of days employed  90.5   
Daily salary  1578   
% employed day-to-day  62.2%   
% employed by season  33.1%   
Nr of employees in sample  196   
 
 
On average, employees work for 3.9 months, or 90.5 days, in the export supply 
chain of green beans. Note that the green bean season coincides with the low agricultural 
season and that labor opportunities (except for employment in agro-industry) are limited 
in this period of the year.  The daily salary for an employee in green bean exports is about 
1600 CFA per day. The large majority of employees are employed on a day-to-day basis. 
About one third is employed on a seasonal basis. 
  Table  3  shows  the  differences  between  employees  in  GlobalGAP  certified 
companies  and  in  non-certified  companies.  In  certified  companies,  employees  work 
during  4.5  rather  than  3.5  months.  The  number  of  months  and  days  worked  is 
significantly larger in certified companies. We do not find a significant difference in the 
salary paid to workers according to the certification of the company. Interestingly, the 
number of workers employed on a day-to-day basis is significantly lower for certified 
firms. In GlobalGAP certified firms 42% of employees are employed on a seasonal basis, 
compared to 27% for non-certified firms.  
 
Table 3: Period of employment during the past 12 months and employment status 













Number of months employed  3.5  4.5  0.00*** 
Total number of days employed  80.3  105.6  0.00*** 
Daily salary  1564  1602  0.36 
% employed day-to-day  66.7%  55.7%  0.06* 
% employed by season  27.4%  41.8%  0.02** 
Nr of employees in sample  117  79   
 
 
These results indicate that employees in certified firms have access to a longer 
period  of  off-farm  employment  in  the  green  bean  exporting  sector  compared  to  non-
certified firms. Given the critique on the fact that the type of employment created in these 
modern supply chains is insecure and volatile, and that workers are recruited on a day-to-
day basis, this is an important finding.  




In this paper we describe how certification to GlobalGAP seems to generate a longer 
export season for green bean exporting firms, and how this effect trickles down to the 
level of employees at these firms. Based on a combination of secondary export data, 
unique company level interviews and unique household survey data in the region of Les 
Niayes in Senegal, we are the first to assess the impact of private standards in modern 
food supply chains on employees, and more specifically on the length and insecurity of 
their employment. We find that certification to GlobalGAP generates a longer season of 
off-farm employment for the rural poor and that employees at GlobalGAP companies 
have  longer  term  contracts  than  employees  at  non-certified  companies.  Given  earlier 
studies that found a very large effect of employment in these sectors on incomes and 
poverty, this is a very important finding. Moreover, these findings challenge the critique 
that the increased modernization of food supply chains and the increasing importance of 
standards is necessarily leading to bad contracts and employment insecurity. 
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